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The objective of this study is to elucidate Taiwan’s 
significance during the different economic period in 
the region. The article is divided into four parts. 
The first section gives a brief explanation on the 
formation of the triangular trading bloc. The second 
section focuses on the production relations across 
the Taiwan Strait and the importance of Taiwanese 
firms in China’s exporting sectors. The third section 
discusses the development of the “four-corner” 
relationships following Taiwan’s massive 
investment in China. The final section draws the 
conclusion by putting the “four-corner” structure 
into the regional economic picture and point out the 
vulnerability of the “economic interdependence” 
between the US and East Asia. 
I. Taiwan, Japan and the US in the 1970s 
and 1980s: the triangular trading bloc 
Since the 1970s, Taiwan has proved itself to be 
successful in attracting a lot of FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment). Although the KMT’s encouragement 
of FDI was aimed at attracting foreign investors 
worldwide, these promotional measures attracted 
US and Japanese investors for the most part. Even 
though the overseas Chinese investment was also 
an important capital inflow to Taiwan during the 
1970s, it was relatively small scale and had less of 
an “international business strategy”. The arrival of 
US and Japanese FDI soon made Taiwan become 
involved in the competition between US and 
Japanese MNCs (Multinational Corporations) and 
more importantly, the formation of the triangular 
trading bloc.  
In Taiwan’s trade balance sheet, the US and Japan 
played the most essential roles. Taiwan’s export to 
the US as a percentage of its total exports increased 
from about 12% in 1960 to 38% in 1970. In the 
1980s, the average exports to the US were 42% of 
Taiwan’s total exports. Especially from 1984 to 
1986, nearly half of Taiwan’s exports aimed the 
American market. Concerning imports, the situation 
was reverse. From 1952 to 1970, Taiwan gradually 
enlarged its imports from Japan. In 1973, about 
43% of Taiwan’s imports came from Japan. In the 
1980s, the average imports from Japan were almost 
30% of Taiwan’s total imports1.  
The reason for Taiwan’s mounting trade deficit 
with Japan was the island’s strong dependence on 
Japanese hi-tech imports. That import dependence 
could be attributed to the following factors. Firstly, 
because of Japanese strict control on their 
technology diffusion, instead of producing locally, 
                                                            
* This article is extracted from the doctoral thesis: Min-Hua 
Chiang [2008], « Le rôle de Taiwan dans l’intégration 
économique de l’Asie-Pacifique », Thèse de Doctorat en 
Économie Internationale, Université Pierre Mendès France, 
Grenoble. 
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1 CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2004, Table 11-9f and 
Table 11-9h. 
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the Taiwan-Japan contractual agreement always 
required the Taiwanese subcontractor to import lots 
of intermediate goods from Japan. Secondly, the 
productivity in Taiwan did not rise enough and the 
domestic industrial upgrade was not able to 
accompany the needs of exporting various high 
technology goods2. In order to keep the high quality 
and different kinds of product requests from all 
over the world, Taiwan’s manufacturers became 
increasingly dependent on Japanese high-tech 
components.3 As a result, the island has always run 
a serious trade deficit with Japan. Although the 
imports of Japanese components allowed Taiwan to 
export more high technology products, the local 
producers on the island could hardly learn how to 
advance their technology level via “technical 
cooperation” with Japanese investors. Due to the 
contract restrictions, the technical bottleneck, and 
quality or price factors, Taiwan was not able to 
acquire substitutes from other countries or to 
produce locally. Because of the impossibility to 
produce the components locally, Japanese 
investment did not really enhance Taiwanese 
technological upgrade.  
While Japanese MNCs strictly 
controlled the technology transfer to 
their Asian affiliates, the American 
MNCs tended to upgrade the 
technological level of the Asian 
affiliates in line with the US in order to 
reduce the dependence on sourcing 
Japanese-made components. When the 
technology in the Asian countries was 
good enough to compete with the 
Japanese component suppliers, the US 
MNCs began to acquire the components 
from their Asian production partners. In 
the 1970s, the US MNCs successfully sourced their 
essential components from other Asian countries by 
spreading the necessary technology to them4. In 
Taiwan’s case, without incurring substantial costs, 
the American investment stimulated Taiwan’s 
capability to produce manufactured products. 
Thanks to the reliability in delivery and flexible 
production, Taiwan’s small and medium-size 
companies were especially favoured by the 
American buyers. As for the consumer goods, 
                                                            
2 Hatch W. and Yamamura K., Asia in Japan’s Embrace: 
Building a Regional Production Alliance, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, p.30. 
3 Taniura T., “The Industrialization of Taiwan: Introduction”, in 
Taniura T. (ed.), Taiwan’s Industrialization: The Formation of 
International Processing Base of Operation, 1992, translated 
from Japanese 1988 Edition, Taiwan no Kogyoka, p.13, (in 
Chinese) 
4 Borrus M., “Left for Dead: Asian Production Networks and the 
Revival of US Electronics”, BRIE, University of California, 
Berkeley, Working Paper, 100, 1997, pp.14-16. 
American buyers not only placed the orders, but 
they also transferred the necessary technology to 
make sure the product respected quality standards. 
Furthermore, the US subsidiaries in electronic 
sectors on the island served as component suppliers 
to the parent companies in the US whilst Japanese 
investors only exported the final goods to a third 
market after assembling the goods on the island. 
The well established inter-firm relationship between 
the US and their Taiwanese partners also helped the 
US regain its dominant position in the global 
production of electronic and other high technology 
goods. Bringing together other subsidiaries to 
purchase raw materials or to sell intermediate goods 
across the region of Asia-Pacific, these MNCs 
brought Taiwan into their production network. 
However, as the US subsidiaries in Asia exported 
the final goods to the US much more than the US 
imported the components from them, America has 
run an immense trade deficit with the Asian 
nations, including Taiwan5. 
In short, the different investment strategies largely 
contributed to Taiwan’s special trade relationship 
with the US and Japan. While the US MNCs 
sourced components in the host country, 
the Japanese MNCs preferred to import 
components from Japan and assemble 
locally. As both American and Japanese 
MNCs aimed at exporting final goods to 
the US market, the increased demand for 
Japanese components led to a trade 
imbalance between Taiwan, Japan and the 
US. With the increase in exports to the US 
and imports from Japan, Taiwan obtained 
an enormous trade balance surplus with 
the US but had a large trade deficit with 
Japan. Consequently, there was a 
triangular structure between the US, Japan and 
Taiwan. However, as Taiwanese firms gradually 
lost their cost competitiveness as a result of the NT 
dollar’s appreciation in the late 1980s and in order 
to keep their production competitiveness in the 
global market, they began to invest in low cost 
manufacturing sites, such as Southeast Asia and 
mainland China. 
                                                            
5 Encarnation D.J., Rivals Beyond Trade: America Versus Japan 
in Global Competition, Cornell University Press, New York, 
1992, p.180. 
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Table 1 : The Operational Profile of Taiwanese Firms in China in 2003 ( %) 
 
Chemical 
Sector 
Metal 
Sector 
Electronic and Electric 
Sector 
Plastic 
Sector 
Total 
Sectors 
Source of procurement 
from: 
     
Taiwan 3.97 35.03 45.70 49.99 39.37 
TIEs in China 1.76 16.47 20.73 20.27 23.91 
Non Taiwan-based companies 
in China 
4.47 33.74 8.21 12.58 26.02 
Other countries 89.80 14.77 25.35 17.16 10.70 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Foreign orders received by:       
Home Companies in Taiwan 55.42 62.32 77.77 78.19 68.32 
Subsidiaries in China 44.58 33.84 18.54 20.93 27.72 
Other Subsidiaries in Other 
regions 
0 3.84 3.69 0.88 3.95 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Finished goods exported 
from: 
     
Home Companies in Taiwan 57.52 40.55 49.23 45.31 46.98 
Subsidiaries in China 42.48 59.27 45.65 50.75 49.80 
Other Subsidiaries in other 
Regions 
0 0.18 5.12 3.94 3.22 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Liu M-C, The Investigation and Analysis on the Operation of Investing Business in the Mainland China, 
Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Commissioned by MOEA, December 2004, Figure 19, 
21, 22, 23 and Table 6, pp.31-37, (in Chinese) 
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Many TIEs in China 
have established 
manufacturing bases 
while the operation 
headquarters, the 
research departments, 
product design, 
marketing and 
finance remained in 
Taiwan. 
 
II. The formation of a new division of 
labour across the Strait 
Since 1993, according to MOEA6, the geographic 
distribution of Taiwanese investment has 
significantly changed from Southeast Asia to 
China. The immediate consequence following 
Taiwan’s massive investment in China is the 
formation of a new division of labour. The typical 
pattern of Taiwanese investment in China is to 
import the intermediate and capital goods from 
Taiwan and export finished goods to the developed 
countries, mainly to the US. This kind of 
production has become especially obvious after the 
mid-1990s. Because of that specific investment 
pattern, international trade between Taiwan and 
China gradually intensified. The MOEA survey in 
2004 showed that in 2003, lots of the 
TIE’s (Taiwan-Invested Enterprise) 
manufacturing procurement in China 
were purchased from either Taiwan 
(39.37%) or from the other TIEs on 
the mainland (23.91%). About 26% of 
manufacturing procurement was from 
other foreign companies in China and 
nearly 11% of it was from other 
countries (See Table 1, p. 3). The 
manufacturing procurement from 
Taiwan-based companies either in 
Taiwan or in China was especially 
prominent in the plastic, electronic 
and electric sectors. In the plastic sector, around 
50% of the manufacturing procurement was from 
Taiwan and 20% was from the other TIEs in China. 
In the electronic and electric sectors, almost 46% of 
the manufacturing procurement was from Taiwan 
and 20.73% was from the TIEs in China. In the 
metal sector, the TIEs imported the raw materials 
and intermediate goods frequently from Taiwan 
(35.03%) or other foreign firms in China (33.74%). 
In the chemical sectors, the dependence on the 
procurement from Taiwan was less clear. Less than 
4% was from Taiwan while nearly 90% of the 
procurement came from other countries. 
The Cross-Strait production relationships resulted 
from Taiwanese investment shows the transfer of 
Taiwan’s whole local production network from the 
island to the mainland. As the downstream 
suppliers of Taiwan also followed the upstream 
partners in investing in China, more and more TIEs 
purchased the intermediate goods directly on the 
mainland. In general, either imported from Taiwan 
or from other countries, the TIEs in China rarely 
                                                            
6 Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC (Taiwan) 
purchase the production necessities from Chinese 
firms. In other words, most of the TIEs, in the 
plastic, electronic and electric sectors in particular, 
only moved their production facilities to China but 
the production links with foreign and other 
Taiwanese firms remained the same. Many TIEs in 
China have established manufacturing bases while 
the operation headquarters, the research 
departments, product design, marketing and finance 
remained in Taiwan. Table 1 reveals that around 
68% of the foreign orders were received by the 
home companies in Taiwan and nearly 50% of the 
foreign sales were exported by the subsidiaries in 
China. This is the typical Taiwanese way of 
production: While the foreign orders are received 
mainly by the home companies on the island, the 
subsidiaries in China are responsible for the 
production and exportation7.  
The TIEs’ dependence on the 
procurement from Taiwan allowed the 
island to become one of the most 
important import sources for China. 
Meanwhile, in China’s total export 
volume, the TIEs also play an important 
role. According to the Top 100 
Exporting Company in China issued by 
the PRC’s Ministry of Commerce in 
2004, 53 out of the top 100 exporting 
companies come from foreign 
enterprises. Among the 53 foreign 
companies, 21 are Taiwan, 11 are 
American, 10 are Korean, 7 are 
Japanese, 2 are Dutch, 1 is German and 
1 is Finnish8. In particular, Foxconn, the subsidiary 
of Hon-Hai Technology Group based in Taiwan, 
has been the leading exporting company in China, 
with the export value of US$ 8.3 milliards in 2004. 
The second largest exporting company is Quanta 
Computer. It is also a Taiwanese company invested 
in China with the export value of US$ 5.3 milliards 
in the same year9. Among 29 foreign firms on the 
                                                            
7 This particular production pattern has been confirmed by many 
economic experts and Taiwanese government, see for example, 
Tung C-Y, “Cross-Strait Economic Relations and Global 
Economic Division of Labor “, Paper for delivery to the CES 
Hong Kong Conference-the Integration of the Greater Chinese 
Economies: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, June 26-
28, 2002, p.14 and MOEA’s Press Release concerning the 
Report on Overseas Chinese & Foreign Investment, Outward 
Investment, Mainland China Investment [2004], available at : 
<http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_external/ctlr?PRO=PrintFri
endlyNews&id=114> (in Chinese). 
8 The Liberty Times, 09 August, 2005, available at: 
<http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2005/new/aug/9/today-
p4.htm> (in Chinese); Also see Ministry of Commerce of PRC. 
9 News from Department of Industrial Technology, MOEA, 04 
Jan. 2006; FDI Statistics from Invest in China, Ministry of 
Commerce of the PRC, available at: 
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/main/indexen.htm>. 
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The intensified trade 
relationship between 
Taiwan and China 
not only diminished 
the significant role of 
Hong Kong as an 
important transit spot 
but also weakened 
Taiwan’s trade 
dependence on the 
US. 
mainland with an export value of more than US$ 1 
milliards in 2004, 14 are Taiwanese firms but most 
of them are registered in a third place like Western 
Samoa, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and 
so on10. These large exports oriented TIEs but 
registered in third places make the official figures 
concerning Taiwan’s investment in China too low. 
Concerning the export destination of TIEs in China, 
it is difficult to access. However, as the TIEs took a 
large portion of China’s exports and the US was the 
main market for China’s final goods, it is widely 
believed that the US is the chief market for the TIEs 
on the mainland11. 
III. The creation of the four-corner 
structure  
Given the quick expansion of Taiwan’s 
investment in China and the formation 
of a production network between the 
two sides of the Strait, the trade 
between Taiwan and China has become 
increasingly more intensified. Due to 
the ROC (Republic of China) 
government’s restraints, most of 
Taiwan’s trade with China was 
conducted via Hong Kong before 2001. 
In spite of the limit, the merchandise 
exchanges between the two nations 
were not effectively reduced. Since the 
early 1990s, Taiwan’s degree of 
dependence on the Chinese markets for 
its exports has exceeded the MOEA’s “warning 
line”12. Imports from China have also progressively 
increased. Overall, according to MCA’s (Mainland 
Affairs Council) estimates, Taiwan’s exports to 
China increased from about US$ 4 milliards in 
1991 to US$ 52 milliards in 2005, or roughly a 12-
fold increase. During the same period, Taiwan’s 
                                                            
10 Except for Foxconn and Quanta Computer, the other 
significant exporting companies from Taiwan are the 
subsidiaries of ASUSTek Computer Inc., Compal Electronics, 
BenQ, MITAC, INVENTEC, AUO, LITEON and Micro-Star 
Internal in China. News from Department of Industrial 
Technology, MOEA, 04 Jan. 2006; FDI Statistics from Invest in 
China, Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. 
11 For example Tung pointed out that around one-fifth of Chinese 
exports to the US were actually produced by Taiwanese 
companies, see Tung C-Y, 2002, op.cit., p.26 and according to 
Business Week’s report, about 40%-80% of China’s exports in 
information and communications hardware are actually made in 
Taiwanese-owned factories, see Business Week, “Why Taiwan 
matters”, 16/05/2005, available at: 
<http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_20/b3933
011.htm>. 
12 Chen Ezra N. H., “The Economic Integration of Taiwan and 
China and Its Implications for Cross-Straight Relations”, 
Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Harvard 
University, Fellow’s Paper, 2003, p.24, available at: 
<http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/papers/2002-
03/index.htm>. 
imports from China, though not as significant as its 
exports to China in absolute terms, have also 
largely increased. In 1991, its imports from China 
was US$ 765.4 million but rose to nearly US$ 20 
milliards in 200513. 
Without considering the transit trade via Hong 
Kong, Taiwan’s exports to the mainland in 
proportion to its total exports has risen dramatically 
from 0% in 1993 to 21.6% in 2005. For the imports, 
its ratio in Taiwan’s total imports has also increased 
from 0.5% in 1990 to 11% in 2005 (See Table 2, 
p.7). The dramatic increases in Taiwan’s trade with 
China also lead to a transformation in Taiwan’s 
trade relationship with other countries. The 
significance of Hong Kong as an essential export 
market for Taiwan lessened. Taiwan’s exports to 
Hong Kong accounted for 23% of its 
total exports in 1995 but it decreased to 
16% in 2005. Imports from Hong Kong 
have made up a large share of Taiwan’s 
total imports, yet, it is a declining trend. 
The intensified trade relationship 
between Taiwan and China not only 
diminished the significant role of Hong 
Kong as an important transit spot but 
also weakened Taiwan’s trade 
dependence on the US. Both Taiwan’s 
exports and imports to and from the US 
decreased after 1990. Since 2003, China 
has already replaced the US as 
Taiwan’s top trading partner. In 2005, 
the US market only took 15% of 
Taiwan’s total exports while Taiwan’s imports from 
the US also fell to 11.6% of total imports. Exports 
to Japan decreased from 12.4% in 1990 to 7.6% of 
Taiwan’s total exports in 2005 even though Japan 
has never been an important export market for the 
island. Nevertheless, imports from Japan have still 
remained relatively important. From 1990 to 2005, 
around 24% to 30% of Taiwan’s total imports still 
came from Japan. The main reason for Taiwan’s 
continuing import dependence on Japan is the 
“technology gap” between these two countries. 
Japanese manufacturers only transferred the 
technology to Taiwan that they considered no 
longer competitive for domestic production or did 
not meet with their cost benefit effectiveness14. 
Meanwhile, Taiwanese producers only “learned” 
from Japan but they were not able to “innovate”15. 
Although Taiwan has successfully moved up into 
                                                            
13 MAC, Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, No. 169, 
Table 6, p.26. 
14 United Daily News, 20 Nov. 1999, the 20th page (in Chinese). 
15 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “Developing the Information 
Industry in Taiwan: Entrepreneurial State, Guerrilla Capitalists, 
and Accommodative Technologists, ” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, 
No. 4, 1995, p.576 
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the regional “technological ladder”, thanks to 
Taiwanese firms’ manufacturing flexibility that fit 
the needs of foreign MNCs, Japan’s continuing 
technology upgrading and strict control of essential 
technology transfer made Taiwan deepen its 
technology intensive imports from Japan16.  
From the above interpretation, we find 
that the original triangular trade 
relationship between Taiwan, Japan and 
the US is transforming into a “four-
corner” trade relationship between 
Taiwan, Japan, the US and China (See 
Figure 1, p.8). Even though China is now 
Taiwan’s top trading partner, a 
considerable proportion of exports from 
Taiwan to the mainland are used in goods 
that are ultimately needed by US firms or 
in the hands of US consumers. Therefore, 
Taiwan’s exports to the US are as 
significant as ever but via China as a 
processing site. The lesser changed 
imports from Japan indicates that Taiwan 
still depends on Japanese imports. While Taiwan 
depends on exporting the intermediate goods to 
China for its trade surplus, it still needs Japanese 
high technology and capital intensive imports and 
the final goods produced by the TIEs on the 
mainland go to the American market. In other 
words, the original production network in the 
region has not changed. China has only followed 
the same export-led economic growth as Japan and 
NICs experienced and inserted itself into the 
regional production network. However, the 
enlarged production network is accompanied by the 
increasing US trade deficit problem.  
 
 
                                                            
16 For example, when Taiwan became the key CD-ROM drive 
producer in the world, the most important element inside the 
CD-ROM drive, the magnetic head, was still imported from 
Japan. When Taiwan was able to make the magnetic head by 
itself, Japan has begun to produce another more advanced CD-
ROM drive, a readable and writable one. Therefore, every time 
Taiwan reaches some technological advancement, Japan has 
already upgraded its technology further. In other words, the 
technology gap between Taiwan and Japan does not diminish 
even though Taiwan also tries to upgrade its technology. 
Japanese technological innovation is always ahead of Taiwan. 
And in order to produce “high technology products” to meet the 
global market needs, the island cannot break it away from 
importing Japanese high technology. Kung Ming-Hsin, “To Take 
the Lead on High Technology is the Prerequisite for the Cross-
Strait Cooperation”, Discussion Papers in Taiwan ThinkTank, 
2003, available at : < 
http://www.taiwanthinktank.org/ttt/servlet/OpenBlock?Template
=Article&category_id=17&article_id=172&lan=tc >. (in 
Chinese) 
IV. After the “four-corner” relationship: 
American trade deficit with China 
Like Japan and the NIC’s (Newly Industrializing 
Country) export-led development process before, 
China has replaced them to become a new and large 
production base. Indeed, it is often 
said that China is like the combined 
export force of Japan and NICs and 
the US is still the key market. It 
meant that various exports that used 
to be made in Japan and NICs are 
now produced in China.  
The mounting imports from China 
allowed China to overtake the other 
Asian countries and become the 
largest import source in Asia for the 
US. On the world level, imports 
from the PRC bypassed that of 
Japan in 2002 and Mexico in 2003 
as the second largest import origin 
for the US. Until 2005, China’s 
exports to the US are still behind Canada and the 
EU countries but its exports are increasing at a 
more rapid rate. In 2005, the US trade deficit with 
China constituted 26% of its total trade deficit17.  
The US policies towards China to reduce its trade 
deficit include three principal means: anti-dumping 
measures, protection of intellectual property rights 
and the appreciation of RMB18. The implementation 
of theses policies is based on the idea that foreign 
trade barriers against American-made products and 
the undervalued RMB relative to US dollar are the 
main causes of the trade deficits. However, the 
consequence of these policies seems quite limited. 
As for the RMB appreciation, the PRC adjusted its 
currency from 8.28 to 8.11 to one dollar in 2005, 
about 2.1% of appreciation rate. Afterwards, China 
has continued to allow the RMB’s appreciation but 
very slowly. However, the US trade deficit with 
China still increased from about US$ 202 milliards 
in 2005 to US$ 256 milliards in 200719. The reasons 
for not to obtaining the expected result is that these 
measures did not “suit the remedy to the case”. 
Instead of blaming foreign trade barriers, we think 
the explanations below could better clarify the 
causes of the US trade deficit.  
                                                            
17 Lum T. and Nanto D.K., “China’s Trade with the United 
States and the World”, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code 
RL31403, 4 January, 2007, pp.6-7, downloadable from the 
website:  
< http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL31403.pdf >. 
18 Renminbi (RMB), the currency of People’s Republic of China. 
19 US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade and Statistics, website: < 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>. 
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Table 2 : Taiwan’s Trade with its Major Commercial Partners as Percentage of the Total Trade 
                                                        
Taiwan’s trade with 
China1 
Taiwan’s trade with 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan’s trade with the 
US 
Taiwan’s trade with 
Japan 
 
Exports to 
China 
Imports 
from China 
Exports to 
HK 
Imports 
from HK 
Exports to 
the US 
Imports from 
the US 
Exports to 
Japan 
Imports 
from Japan 
1990 - - 12.7 2.7 32.4 23.0 12.4 29.2 
1991 0 0.5 16.3 3.1 29.3 22.4 12.1 30.0 
1992 0 1.0 18.9 2.5 28.9 21.9 10.9 30.2 
1993 0 1.3 21.7 2.2 27.7 21.7 10.6 30.1 
1994 0.1 2.2 22.9 1.8 26.2 21.1 11.0 29.0 
1995 0.3 3.0 23.4 1.8 23.7 20.1 11.8 29.2 
1996 0.5 3.0 23.1 1.7 23.2 19.5 11.8 26.9 
1997 0.5 3.4 23.5 1.7 24.2 20.3 9.6 25.4 
1998 0.8 3.9 22.4 1.9 26.6 18.8 8.4 25.8 
1999 2.1 4.1 21.4 1.9 25.4 17.8 9.8 27.6 
2000 2.8 4.4 21.1 1.6 23.5 17.9 11.2 27.5 
2001 3.9 5.5 21.9 1.7 22.5 17.0 10.4 24.1 
2002 7.6 7.1 23.6 1.5 20.5 16.1 9.2 24.2 
2003 14.9 8.6 19.7 1.4 18.0 13.2 8.3 25.6 
2004 19.5 9.9. 17.1 1.2 16.2 12.9 7.6 26.0 
2005 21.6 11.0 16.2 1.0 15.1 11.6 7.6 25.3 
Source: CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2006, Table 11-9f and Table 11-9h, pp.223-226; MAC, Cross-Strait Economic 
Statistics Monthly, No. 169, Table 8. 
Note:  1. Taiwan’s trade with China excludes the indirect trade via Hong Kong. 
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Figure 1  
The Transformation of Taiwan’s Trade Relationship with its Major Partners 
Triangular Trade Relationship in the 1980s 
 
Four-Corner Trade Relationship after the 1990s 
 
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook and Taiwan Statistical Data Book, various years. 
Note: 1. The amounts indicated are the total value in the 1980s and from 1990  to 2005 in $US milliards. 
 2. The trade amounts between Taiwan and China are recorded after 1991. 
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The fundamental 
problem today is not 
simply the mounting 
US trade deficit with 
China but how the 
US trade deficit can 
be sustained in the 
long run? 
 
Firstly, it is widely said that the major cause of 
American trade deficit is the insufficient saving and 
excessive investment in the US. The US does not 
save enough to finance its domestic investment. 
Hence, instead of adjusting the exchange rate, 
increasing the saving and investment rates are 
considered as more important solutions to change 
the trade deficit situation20. Secondly, some have 
reasoned that the US trade deficit was a result of 
sluggish export demand, especially after the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997. The economic slowdown in 
many Asian countries, except for China, made them 
unable to absorb many American exports. The 
Asian financial crisis and the IMF’s strict economic 
adjustment measures that followed led to a 
reduction in US exports to Asian nations21. 
Although China suffered less from the 
1997 financial crisis, its relative low 
GDP per capita limited the domestic 
consumption of foreign goods. 
Therefore, in addition to increased US 
imports, the inability of America’s trade 
partners to absorb US exports is also 
quite essential in explaining the 
increasing US trade deficit. The third 
reason for the continued trade deficit is 
America’s excessive demand of labour-
intensive and consumer goods from 
China22. In fact, America’s excessive demand of 
consumer goods from other countries had already 
started in the 1970s which implied the loss of 
competitiveness for certain US-made products in 
the international market. Since China has acted as 
the “world factory”, the US trade deficit problem 
with the rest of the world inevitably transferred to 
China for the most part. The US MNCs’ outward 
investment and the re-exported goods from host 
countries to the American market have been the 
main cause of the US trade deficit. In addition, the 
weaker structural elasticity of exports than that of 
imports has made the US balance of payment even 
worse23.  
                                                            
20 Griswold D.T.,” The Causes and Consequences of the US 
Trade Deficit”, Congressional Testimony before the Senate 
Finance Committee, Washington, D.C., 11 June, 1998, available 
at: < http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-dg061198.html>. 
21 Blecker R.A., “The Causes of the U.S. Trade Deficit”, 
Statement before the Trade Deficit Review Commission, 
Washington, D.C., August 1999, pp.11-12, downloadable from 
the website: 
<http://nw08.american.edu/~blecker/policy/TradeDeficitStateme
nt.pdf>. 
22 Lum T. and Nanto D.K., op.cit., 2007, pp.21-22. 
23 Vanel G., “L’économie politique de l’étalon dollar : les Etats-
Unis et le nouveau régime financier international”, Thèse de 
Doctorat en Economie Internationale, Université Pierre Mendès 
France, Grenoble, 2005, p.258. 
To sum up, the US trade deficit problem is not 
simply a US-PRC bilateral commercial imbalance, 
but rather, it is a commercial imbalance between the 
US and the whole East Asia region. China’s 
economic opening up has enlarged the original 
regional production network but it did not change 
the Asia-USA commercial relationship. As already 
mentioned, China is used as a processing base for 
many Asian export oriented MNCs. Hence, the 
original US-Asia supply and demand relationship 
that caused the American trade deficit still remains 
the same. The only thing that changed is the trade 
deficit changed from with Japan and the NICs to 
with China. Therefore, the fundamental problem 
today is not simply the mounting US trade deficit 
with China but how the US trade deficit can be 
sustained in the long run? The economic 
interdependent framework between the US and East 
Asian countries (particularly the NIC, 
Japan and China) is the following: 
while the US allows Asian countries to 
export the goods to the American 
market, most of the Asian foreign 
exchange reserves are used to purchase 
US Treasury securities. Without the 
Asian nations’ large purchases of US 
Treasury securities, it is hard to 
imagine how the US could fund its 
federal budget deficit. But the stability 
of the US dollar as an international currency is 
doubtful. Actually, the US government has already 
confronted a difficulty with the rising US trade 
deficit. The international investors will tire of 
financing the US deficit as they have their own 
investment interests and strategies. Instead of 
continuing to buy US Treasury securities, some 
Asian central banks also began to diversify their 
foreign exchange holdings24. In order to keep their 
product competitiveness, the Asian countries are 
unwilling to appreciate their national currency to 
finance the US deficit. As a result, the 
interdependent framework between the US and 
Asian countries has its limit25. Furthermore, unlike 
the other Asian economies, China may be less 
willing to buy American Treasury securities via its 
enormous foreign exchange reserves. The main 
reason for this way of thinking is that China today 
shows more ambitions to strengthen its economic 
and political force in the world. The long-standing 
Sino-US rivalry puts China’s willingness to finance 
the American deficit into question. If and when the 
                                                            
24 “Greenspan Says Dollar Drop May Reflect Falling US Debt 
Demand”, Bloomberg News, available at the website: 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a
M8c5RLyltiI&refer=news>. 
25 Vanel G., op.cit., 2005, pp.287-296 
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investors decide to abandon the US dollar, a large 
financial crisis will surely be unavoidable. 
The growing US trade deficit also raises an 
important question: Will that trade deficit 
jeopardize the American economic dominance in 
the world? History tells us that when hegemonic 
state passes from a net creditor to a net debtor, its 
dominance in the world might soon decline. Like 
the UK in the 19th century, Sterling was the most 
used foreign currency in international trade and 
main foreign exchange reserve for many holding 
countries. Its export value was also much more than 
its imports. However, this dominant position was 
changed when the UK began to borrow from the 
US to fight WWI. The US dollar then emerged 
gradually as a major international currency. The 
decline in the pound not only led to the loss of 
British economic dominance but also its military 
power in the world. Some think that the US today, 
with the increasing trade deficit, will probably go 
down the same path as the British Empire did 
before26. The principal international political 
economy theories, including Marxist, Realist and 
Liberalist perspectives, also show an unavoidable 
decline of a hegemony or a fight for a dominant 
power between nations when a hegemonic state is 
no longer strong enough to hold on to its position. 
Once the US-led economic system collapses, a 
serious financial crisis that followed will 
unavoidably lead to a hegemon’s crisis in the near 
future. 
 
                                                            
26 Frankel J., “Could the Twin Deficits Jeopardize US 
Hegemony”, Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol.28, 2006, pp.661-
662. 
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